Examination of Merricks' Primitivism about Truth by Fisher, A. R. J.
Metaphysica, forthcoming 15:2. DOI: 10.1515/mp-2014-0017 
 
Examination of Merricks Primitivism about Truth 
a. r. j. fisher 
 
Abstract     Trenton Merricks (2007) argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism 
about truth: being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination 
consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks argument for his view, a rejec-
tion of his objection against Paul Horwichs (1998) minimalist theory of truth, and a direct 
objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspi-
cious property. The conclusion is that Merricks primitivism should be rejected. 
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1 Introduction 
Theories of truth are often ambiguous between giving an account of the nature of 
truth and giving an analysis of the concept of truth. Theories of the latter are proposed 
in the following schema: 
 (C) for all x, x is true iff  x  
The correspondence theory fills in this schema as: for all x, x is true iff x corre-
sponds to some fact (Moore 1953, 267-9; Russell 1912, 127). Other relational theories 
of truth such as coherence (Alcoff 1996) and pragmatist theories (James 1909) of truth 
offer similar analyses of the concept of truth in terms of the notion of coherence and 
utility respectively. Since these theories give an account of the concept of truth, let us 
call them conceptual accounts of truth. So if you declare that the concept of truth does 
not admit of analysis, you are a conceptual primitivist about truth. You think truth is 
conceptually unanalysable. 
In contrast, theories that give an account of the nature of truth give an account of 
the property being true that is had by some propositions or truth-bearers and not oth-
ers.1 They are proposed in the following schema: 
(O) what it is for a truth to have the property being true is  for  it  to  stand  in  
some more fundamental relation R with some other entity. 
The correspondence theory on an ontological construal posits a primitive relation 
of having correspondence to that holds between a truth and some fact. Similarly, co-
herence and pragmatist theories of truth posit the relation having coherence with and 
having some utility for respectively that in part grounds the property being true. Since 
these theories give an account of the property being true, let us call them ontological 
                                               
1 Throughout this paper I remain neutral about the nature of the bearers of truth, although I refer to 
truth-bearers as propositions. And sometimes I write propositions with angle brackets: the proposition 
that p is written as <p>.  
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accounts of truth. So if you declare that the property being true does not admit of 
analysis, you are an ontological primitivist about truth. You think truth is ontically 
unanalysable. Trenton Merricks (2007) has recently defended ontological primitivism 
about truth. He takes being true to be a primitive property that has a robust nature. It 
is monadic and non-intrinsic. 
Given the concept of truth/being true distinction, we could take the concept and 
property as primitive or take the property but not the concept as primitive or perhaps 
give a conceptual and ontological analysis of both. It all depends on what you take 
your particular project of analysis to consist in. Some are concerned with conceptual 
analysis and others are focused on truths underlying nature and hence concerned 
about ontological analysis. The latter concern requires us to be clear on what kind of 
property we think being true is  or  at  least  have  some  conception  of  properties  as  a  
background framework within which we present our ontological account of truth. The 
subject of truth in philosophy is a topic that we arrive at in media res. And as such it 
has its beginning and its end elsewhere. 
To illustrate, consider the minimalist theory of truth as defended by Paul Horwich 
(hereafter minimalism). For Horwich, the concept of truth is primitive since he thinks 
the concept does not admit of analysis in the sense that there is no need for a specifi-
cation (in philosophically unproblematic terms) of the content of every statement em-
ploying the concept (Horwich 1998, 10). So if that is the project of analysis, then 
Horwich is a conceptual primitivist about truth in this particular sense. But Horwich is 
well aware that there is more to truth than our concept of it. According to Horwich, 
there is a property being true that is had by some propositions and not others. But he 
thinks it is not a substantive or naturalistic property or that it is constituted by more 
fundamental properties. Instead being true is a logical property and its role and use is 
exhausted by its predicate  is true. So, in one sense he is an ontological primitivist 
about truth. But being true for Horwich does not have a robust nature like that of 
Merricks primitivism. So we need another distinction: let us distinguish between 
strong and weak ontological primitivism about truth. Strong ontological primitivism 
takes being true as substantive whereas weak ontological primitivism takes being true 
as non-substantive. Horwich is a weak ontological primitivist and Merricks is a strong 
ontological primitivist. 
Merricks defence of primitivism is supported by a sustained attack against compet-
ing theories of truth and a book-length criticism of truthmaking.2 For Merricks, the 
final dispute is between primitivism and Paul Horwichs (1998) minimalism. Merricks 
argues that since we should reject minimalism, we should adopt primitivism. This is 
where I enter the dialectic. I think Merricks arguments can be resisted and a critical 
discussion of his version of primitivism reveals that being true, that is the property and 
not the concept, is rendered mysterious and suspicious. Primitivism entails that being 
true mysteriously points towards reality and points beyond itself in an unacceptable 
way.  
This paper is an examination of Merricks primitivism about truth. It is not a com-
prehensive discussion of primitivism in general and in objecting to Merricks primitiv-
                                               
2 I do not discuss theories of truthmaking in this paper as I focus on Horwichs minimalism and Mer-
ricks primitivism, although I give some remarks in the final section. For truthmaking see (Armstrong 
2004). 
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ism I am merely rejecting his version of the view.3 My dialectic is strictly confined to 
Merricks primitivism and Horwichs minimalism. Hence I do not consider other vari-
ants of primitivism or minimalism. This is after all how Merricks constructs the de-
bate. His defence, arguments for his version of primitivism and objections against min-
imalism have received little to no attention in the literature. So if my critique of Mer-
ricks is correct, this paper advances an under-discussed dialectic and addresses a yet 
unexamined position in the subject of truth in philosophy.  
In what follows,  I  present Merricks  general  argument against  competing theories  
of truth and set up the debate between his version of primitivism and Horwichs min-
imalism (§2). I argue that Merricks objection against minimalism does not succeed 
(§3). I then present his version of primitivism (§4) and argue that it entails that being 
true is a mysterious and suspicious property (§5). I critically discuss a reply (§6) and 
then conclude that within the context of the debate between minimalism and primitiv-
ism we should not adopt Merricks primitivism (§7). 
 
2 Merricks Primitivism and Horwichs Minimalism 
Merricks (2007) argues that all  relational  theories  of  truth and truthmaking are false 
because there are some truths that are true in virtue of  no relation to some entity or 
proposition, whether that relation is one of utility, coherence, correspondence, etc.4 
Since all relational theories of truth are false, we are left with non-relational theories of 
truth. According to Merricks, there are two non-relational theories on offer, namely, 
minimalism and primitivism. So the debate between non-relational theories is a dispute 
between primitivism and minimalism. Let us consider the relevant differences between 
minimalism and primitivism in order to understand the debate. Recall the debate here 
is between Merricks primitivism and Horwichs minimalism. From now on when I use 
the term primitivism it refers to Merricks version of primitivism. 
Horwich says truth has no underlying robust nature. But although it has no under-
lying nature, there is the property being true. It is just that being true is not a robust 
property. So Horwichs denial of primitivism can be understood as a denial of strong 
ontological primitivism. Now the core of minimalism is the equivalence schema: 
(E) The proposition that p is true just in case p.  
Minimalists, true to their name, state that our theory of truth is nothing more than: 
(MT) The proposition that quarks really exist is true if and only if quarks really exist, 
the proposition that lying is bad is true if and only if lying is bad,  and so on (Hor-
wich 1998, 5). 
According to Horwich, we begin with instances of (E), e.g., the proposition that 
snow is white is true just in case snow is white, and then show how our acceptance of 
                                               
3 For a recent defence of primitivism, see (Asay 2013). In this paper I am merely concerned with Mer-
ricks version of primitivism. 
4 Merricks also discusses and rejects the identity theory of truth. He rejects the identity theory before 
narrowing the debate down to minimalism versus primitivism. So the identity theory is not relevant to 
our main discussion.  
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these instances and in fact the infinite conjunction of these instances constitutes our 
concept of truth. This does not amount to a conceptual analysis in an explicit sense. It 
is merely an implicit definition if anything. And the fact that we do not have an explic-
it definition of the concept does not entail that we cannot grasp it. The way we grasp 
the concept of truth, according to Horwich, is by our disposition to accept instances of 
(E). It is taken as a basic explanatory fact that we have this disposition (Horwich 
1998, 126). Instances of (E) are taken as conceptually basic and known a priori. This 
entails that the story about truth is incomplete. But, as David Lewis points out, there 
is no need to complete it. The untold part merely repeats the same pattern over and 
over, so a tiny sample tells us all we need to know (2001, 603). Our ability to go on 
adding instances of the same pattern is grounded in the fact that the notion of a prop-
osition is prior to the notion of truth. As Horwich writes,  
 minimalism entails that the notion of proposition [does] not depend on the notion 
of truth. For the minimalists direction of conceptual priority is the other way round: in 
so far as our concept of truth is constituted by our acceptance of instances of The 
proposition that p is true iff p, we must already be capable of grasping propositions 
(1998, 16-7). 
In short, we need the notion of a proposition to be prior to the notion of truth 
since (MT) is conceptually basic and our acceptance of instances of (E) constitutes our 
concept of truth. To recap, the following features are a sufficient characterisation of 
minimalism: 1) being true exists as a non-substantive property, 2) (MT) is conceptually 
basic and known a priori, and 3) the notion of a proposition is prior to the notion of 
truth.  
Primitivism, put briefly, is the view that being true is a primitive, non-intrinsic 
property had by some propositions and not others. Since being true is not analysed in 
terms of any further entity, it is not analysed in terms of some relation. Thus, primitiv-
ism counts as a non-relational account of truth.5 There are two relevant differences be-
tween minimalism and primitivism. First, minimalists take instances of (E) as brute and 
our disposition to accept instances of (E) as constituting our concept of truth, whereas 
primitivists take our grasping of being true as fundamental and that which grounds 
our understanding of (MT). Merricks claims that by grasping the property being true 
we understand instances of (E). He says, [t]his [grasping] allows us to recognize some 
of what being true implies (2007, 190). Merricks compares our grasping of being true 
with the property of being self-identical. By grasping the property of identity, we rec-
ognise that it implies that identity is reflexive, transitive and symmetric. With respect 
to truth, Merricks continues, [a]mong its implications are the biconditionals included 
in MT, some of which we understand and can articulate (2007, 190); he then goes on 
to say our ability to continue to articulate the biconditionals that constitute [(MT)] is 
rooted in our grasp of the property of being true (2007, 191, my italics). By contrast, 
Horwich says that taking instances of the equivalence schema as conceptually basic 
provides us with the correct direction of explanation. Other theories of truth, he states, 
do not provide a good account of why it is that instances of the equivalence schema 
                                               
5 Given this characterisation of primitivism, being true cannot be rendered a primitive relation. This 
makes sense since, as Merricks notes, being true is monadic and so not a relation (although he thinks it 
is non-intrinsic). I bracket relational theories in what follows and merely focus on non-relational ac-
counts of truth. 
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are true. Minimalism involves a reversal of that explanatory direction (Horwich 1998, 
11-12). 
Second, minimalists take the ontological status of being true as non-substantive. 
The minimalist is nothing more than a weak ontological primitivist given the distinc-
tions drawn in the Introduction. On the other hand, the primitivist claims that being 
true is a substantive property. So Merricks is a strong ontological primitivist. Indeed, 
primitivists like Merricks must be committed to the claim that being true is a substan-
tive property since being true is used to explain how we understand instances of (E). 
Being true is  doing  more  work  than  merely  being  the  referent  of  the  predicate   is  
true. If it is doing real work in the theory, it is a substantive property.6  
You might think this yields a real difference and hence disagreement between prim-
itivism and minimalism. However, Merricks thinks Horwich must deny the existence 
of being true to make minimalism consistent with the denial of primitivism. The argu-
ment is that Horwich denies primitivism, so he thinks being true is not unanalysable 
but yet he says that truth is not susceptible to analysis. Merricks concludes that the 
way out of the inconsistency for Horwich is to deny the existence of being true. Mer-
ricks writes, 
The only way to render these two claims consistent is to deny that there is any such 
property at all. For only then can it be false that being true is analysable and also false 
that being true is primitive (2007, 189).  
But Merricks objection is misplaced due to a misunderstanding of Horwich. Ac-
cording to minimalism, the concept of truth is primitive in a specific sense, namely, 
there is no explicit definition of the concept. Horwich thinks the concept of truth is 
implicitly defined by the equivalence schema. In addition, it is one thing to say that be-
ing true has no analysis and quite another to say that the concept of truth is primitive. 
Horwichs denial of primitivism thus amounts to a denial of strong ontological primi-
tivism while accepting that the concept of truth is primitive in the sense that there is no 
explicit analysis consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
So we have a genuine disagreement between Merricks primitivism and Horwichs 
minimalism. Merricks thinks by grasping being true we understand some of the bicon-
ditionals of (MT) and Horwich thinks we begin with some of the biconditionals of 
(MT) as conceptually basic and then provide an implicit definition of the concept of 
truth. The dispute between minimalism and primitivism boils down to the explanatory 
direction between being true and (MT). Either being true comes first, then (MT) or 
(MT) comes first, then the concept of truth. 
 
3 Merricks against Horwichs Minimalism 
Merricks argues that primitivism is to be preferred over minimalism because minimal-
ism does not properly explain how we understand instances of (E). If we begin with 
the infinite  series  of  instances of  (E),  i.e.,  <cats  purr> is  true iff  cats  purr,  and so on,  
then we cannot explain how we add further instances of (E) to the infinite series. Thus, 
                                               
6 Primitivism is typically classified as a robust theory independent of this argument. See (Lynch 2001, 4).  
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it is mysterious that we know to add <dogs bark> is true iff dogs bark. And therefore 
it is equally mysterious how the infinite series constitutes our concept of truth 
(Merricks 2007, 190). We should not accept this mystery. Hence we should reject min-
imalism. Merricks writes, 
Given MT, it is mysterious that we know to add that that dogs bark is true if and only 
if dogs bark. More generally, it is mysterious that we know how to go on adding the 
biconditionals that constitute MT. In particular, if MT is right, we cannot explain our 
ability to go on by way of our understanding MT. That explanation is viciously cir-
cular, since to understand MT just is to be able to go on (2007, 190). 
We can construct the objection as follows: 
 (P1) (MT) is conceptually basic. 
(P2) If (MT) is conceptually basic, it is mysterious that we know to add instanc-
es of (E). 
 (C) Thus, it is mysterious that we know to add instances of (E).  
The argument is valid and (P1) is true according to minimalism. So, the objection 
rests on the truth of (P2). Why should we accept (P2)? Merricks reason for accepting 
(P2) seems to be based on the claim that our understanding of (MT) consists in our 
ability to go on adding instances of  (E).  He writes,  our being able to go on  in this  
way counts as our understanding MT (2007, 189). If our ability to go on adding in-
stances constitutes our understanding of (MT), then it is mysterious that we know to 
add an instance of (E) because we cannot explain this fact since it is equivalent to our 
understanding of (MT) which is what we are taking as brute. Thus, according to Mer-
ricks, if (MT) is conceptually basic, it is mysterious that we know to add instances of 
(E).  
But why should we accept that our ability to go on adding instances of (E) consti-
tutes our understanding of (MT)? Merricks gives no reason to accept this claim and 
there are reasons to believe that our understanding of (MT) is not exhausted by our 
ability to go on adding instances of (E) but rather contains it as a mere part. Our un-
derstanding of (MT) is based on the fact that we understand what instantiation means, 
the notion of a proposition and the fact that we can simply plug into (E) any instance 
we wish. To illustrate, we understand that <cows moo> has the property being true 
because we understand that <cows moo> is true iff cows moo. This requires that we 
understand the notion of instantiation and the notion of a proposition. But, since 
(MT) is  an infinite  series  of  instances of  (E),  our understanding of (MT) requires the 
added component of understanding the concept of and so on. Our understanding of 
and so on is our grasping of the repetition of the same pattern. This is nothing more 
than knowing how to add instances of (E). Thus, our understanding of (MT) is not 
merely our ability to go on. Rather our ability to go on is part of our understanding 
of (MT).  
Since the minimalist takes the notion of a proposition as primitive, we can accept 
this explanation. Therefore, we can reject Merricks claim that our ability to go on or 
our understanding of what and so on means constitutes our understanding of (MT), 
and therefore reject the truth of (P2). So, Merricks objection fails. Moreover, we 
examination of merricks primitivism about truth     7 
 
should accept that the direction of explanation is from (MT) to being true since it is 
not plausible to suppose that the direction of explanation is from being true to (MT). 
Recall that Merricks thinks we grasp being true, realise it implies instances of (E), and 
that this is a sufficient explanation of our understanding of (MT). If we reject that our 
understanding of (MT) is constituted solely by our ability to go on adding instances 
of (E), our knowing whether a proposition instantiates being true depends on its corre-
sponding instance of (E). As Merricks admits, 
I know that humans exist, and I know that that humans exist is true if and only if hu-
mans exist; this is how I know that the proposition that humans exist exemplifies the 
property of being true (2007, 190). 
So even Merricks thinks we know that a proposition has the property being true 
based on the fact that we know the corresponding instance of (E). But, if we know that 
a proposition has the property of being true because we know its corresponding in-
stance of (E), we have appealed to an instance of (E) to explain how we know being 
true. To say that we know a proposition instantiates being true because we know its 
instance of (E) requires the notion of a proposition to be prior to the notion of truth 
since any instance of (E) is known a priori and so known in virtue of grasping the no-
tion of a proposition. If we require the notion of a proposition to be prior to the no-
tion of truth, we must accept the minimalists direction of explanation.  
 
4 Merricks Primitivism 
According to Merricks, being true is a primitive or fundamental property of proposi-
tions. But what does it mean to say that a property is primitive or fundamental? What 
it means for a property to be primitive can be understood by determining what it 
means for a property to be non-primitive. For Merricks, these [latter] properties are 
built up out of, or analysable in terms of, or reducible to, other properties (2007, 49). 
He provides an example: 
Suppose that being a bachelor is analysed as (or reduced to) being unmarried, being el-
igible, and being male. Then, necessarily, the exemplification of being a bachelor su-
pervenes on the exemplification of being unmarried, being eligible, and being male 
(2007, 49).   
The fact that some particular exemplifies being a bachelor entails that being a 
bachelor has a local supervenience base.7 Thus, being a bachelor has a local superveni-
ence base just in case the instantiation of being a bachelor by a person is necessitated 
by the instantiation of being unmarried, being eligible and being male by  that  same  
person. More generally, an analysis of being F entails that there is, of necessity, a local 
supervenience base for being F. If being F has a local supervenience base, it is not 
primitive. If being F is not primitive, it must supervene on the properties or relations 
that are part of its analysis or reduction. If being F fails  to supervene on some other 
properties or relations, or being F fails to have a local supervenience base, it is primi-
tive. Thus, a primitive property is a property that lacks a local supervenience base; 
primitive properties do not supervene on any further properties (Merricks 2007, 54). 
                                               
7 Local supervenience is to be contrasted with global supervenience, the latter being concerned with dis-
cernibility between worlds while the former is about supervenience within a world. 
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According to Merricks, being true is a primitive property. Thus, being true does 
not have a local  supervenience base.  So,  it  is  not the case that necessarily if  <p> has 
(say) being G, H, I, then <p> has the property being true, where being G, H, and I are 
putative properties that might constitute an ontological analysis of being true. Or, as-
suming a relational account of truth, if being true is  primitive,  it  is  not the case that 
necessarily if <p> is related to p in virtue of R, then <p> has the property being true. 
Merricks argues that being true is primitive. Merricks argument for the claim that 
being true is primitive runs as follows. If being true is non-relational, then any analysis 
of being true must be in terms of non-relational properties of truths. Since no analysis 
that fits this restriction looks promising, being true is primitive. However, this argu-
ment is not relevant here because minimalism accepts the conclusion even though it 
rejects that being true is substantive. The argument in general does little work dialecti-
cally speaking since relational theorists deny the premise that being true is non-
relational. Finally, the argument has been shown by Jonathan Schaffer to equivocate 
between a conceptual and ontological analysis of truth (Schaffer 2008, 309, n. 13). 
Merricks blurs the distinction between concept and property. The fact that being true 
is primitive does not entail that our concept of it is primitive and vice-versa. 
Putting Merricks argument for his version of primitivism aside, he claims not only 
that being true is primitive but that being true is a non-intrinsic property. Typically, a 
non-intrinsic property is a property that is had by an individual because the individual 
stands in some relation to some other object. For example, being a wife is non-intrinsic 
since its instantiation depends on the marriage relation that holds between husband 
and wife. However, Merricks thinks there are some properties that are non-intrinsic, 
but instantiated by an entity in virtue of some other entity without any relation hold-
ing between the two entities. There are, according to Merricks, non-relational but non-
intrinsic properties and being true is one of them. He writes, 
[Being true] is not intrinsic. For whether a proposition exemplifies being true is often a 
matter of how things are around it. For example, whether that dogs bark is true is not 
only a matter of what that proposition is like, but also a matter of whether there are 
any dogs and what those dogs do (2007, 182).    
The use of the term monadic by Merricks is non-standard. Typically, if a property 
is monadic, it does not entail that the property is non-relational. For example, being an 
uncle is monadic but not non-relational. Being an uncle is monadic in virtue of being a 
property that has one slot or has as its logical form one-place which need only be 
saturated by one object. This non-standard use of monadic is not itself objectiona-
ble. But note well that Merricks uses the terms monadic and non-relational inter-
changeably. 
Since primitivism is consistent with truth depending on reality in the trivial and 
noncontroversial sense that <p> is true because p (cf. Merricks 2007, 186), primitivism 
entails that being true is  a  non-relational,  non-intrinsic  primitive  property  that  is  in-
stantiated by some propositions and not others because of what a given proposition is 
like and what exists around it. But no relation is posited to elucidate this claim. 
Whether certain propositions such as necessary ones are true or not wont be a matter 
of what goes on in the physical world. Necessary propositions in virtue of what they 
are like also stand in no relation to the world. So, a (contingent) proposition having 
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the property being true does not stand in a relation to anything yet it having being true 
is a matter of what goes on in the world.  
 
5 Against Merricks Primitivism 
Merricks primitivism is subject to a familiar objection that charges primitivism with 
leaving the concept of truth shrouded in mystery. Horwich puts the objection briefly as 
follows: 
[Consider the view] that truth is an indefinable, inexplicable quality that some proposi-
tions simply have and others simply lacka fundamental property of which no ac-
count can be provided. This gives a sense of impenetrable mysteriousness to the notion 
of truth and can be the resort only of those who feel that the decent alternatives have 
been exhausted (1998, 9-10). 
Horwichs objection is that if being true is primitive and taken as substantive, then 
the concept of truth is mysterious. Therefore, we should not accept that being true is a 
primitive substantive property. The objection is targeted at strong ontological primitiv-
ists about truth. But its main weakness is that it rejects strong ontological primitivism 
on the grounds that it renders the concept of truth as mysterious. Merricks can easily 
reply that we do in fact grasp the concept of truth even though the property being true 
is primitive and so the concept is not mysterious, which he does (Merricks 2007, 185). 
Just because being true is primitive it does not mean we cannot grasp the correspond-
ing concept. So the objection has an invalid premise. 
But we can bolster this objection by arguing that if being true is a substantive prim-
itive property, then the property itself (i.e., being true) and not the concept is mysteri-
ous. We can develop this objection by arguing on metaphysical grounds that being true 
is mysterious and suspicious given Merricks primitivism. Horwichs objection is too 
brief and does not get to the heart of the issue, which is really an issue about the meta-
physical nature of properties and not about our concepts of the subject matter. As we 
will see, my version of the argument is distinct from Horwichs and so is a new argu-
ment against primitivism, or at least against Merricks version. Moreover, Horwichs 
overall position against primitivism is not that the view is false but rather that it is in-
adequate because it fails to fulfil explanatory demands concerning instances of the 
equivalence schema (see Horwich 1998, 11-2). We can do better here, I submit, by 
showing that there is something ontologically repugnant with the property being true, 
according to Merricks primitivism. 
Here is my developed version of the objection. If we accept the claim that an object 
can have a property because of some other thing, then, clearly, we admit the object in 
question which has the property is related to the other thing in some way. If we accept 
that an object having a property is related to some other thing, then intuitively it 
stands in some relation to that other thing. If we accept the fact that whether being 
true is instantiated or not is a matter of something in the world, being true is related 
and hence stands in some relation to some entity or entities in the world. This is the 
intuitive claim concerning our concept of truth if we accept that which propositions 
are true is a matter of what goes on around them. This is the intuitive understanding 
of the dyadic expression  is a matter of . To see this, consider necessary truths. If 
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necessary truths are not true because of the world while contingent truths are, then we 
need to explain this difference by positing a relation in the latter case that does not 
hold in the former. If there is no relation in both cases, where is the difference? If it is a 
matter of what is around contingent propositions that determines whether they have 
being true, then intuitively there is a relation to account for this fact. Indeed, if we ac-
cept the intuition that truth depends on being, even in a trivial and noncontroversial 
sense, then intuitively truth, 
 has to do with what the truth bearer is about, rather than some internal or intrin-
sic feature of the truth bearer,  truth has to do with the relation of a potential truth 
bearer to a reality beyond itself (Alston 1996, 7-8).  
According to Merricks, there is no relation with which a proposition and the world 
can be intuitively related. Hence, Merricks use of the dyadic expression  is a matter 
of  is counter-intuitive. However, if we accept Merricks counter-intuitive under-
standing of  is a matter of , being true has a mysterious nature of pointing to-
wards certain entities in the world which are mysteriously related to certain proposi-
tions without a relation that stands between a truth and the world. Worse still, being 
true not only points towards other entities in a mysterious way (for there is no rela-
tion to explain why this is so) it also has a brute nature of pointing beyond itself. If 
being true points beyond itself or its instances, then being true is also a suspicious 
property. Property F is suspicious if the instances of F point beyond what instantiates 
them. To use Ross Camerons (2011) example, suppose I instantiate being such as to 
have been a child, a property that is directed towards the past. Suppose further that we 
take this property as primitive. It follows that we have no explanation as to why this 
property has the feature of being directed towards the past and so no relation to 
ground this propertys nature. The primitive property being such as to have been a 
child is suspicious because my instantiation of it right now is not part of my intrinsic 
nature right now.  
Analogously, being true is directed towards what truth-bearers are about. Whether 
being true is instantiated is a matter of what goes on around the proposition. But if so, 
then being true points beyond its instances and points towards other entities distinct 
from its instances (i.e., distinct from the propositions that instantiate being true). Now, 
we could give an explanation of the directedness of being such as to have been a child 
if we posited some past time at which there exists some entity that I am currently relat-
ed to. We could also give an explanation of the directedness of being true if we posit-
ed some relation between truth and reality. But this sort of explanation is exactly what 
primitivism rules out. Thus, being true is mysterious and suspicious. Merricks rejects 
suspicious properties for the same reasons I just mentioned (see Merricks 2007, 60). 
So, if being true is suspicious according to primitivism, Merricks should also reject 
primitivism.  
To be clear, I am not arguing that being true is mysterious because it is primitive. 
Of course, every theory must have primitives and given that primitives lack the illumi-
nating explanation that non-primitives enjoy we are denied a particular insight into 
their nature. We are therefore at the mercy of the intuitive concepts of the things we 
take as primitive. Following Lewis, I think it is best to take familiar things as primitive 
and avoid unduly complex and unduly mysterious primitives (Lewis 1983, 353). My 
objection is that the way Merricks takes being true as primitive (i.e., as non-relational 
examination of merricks primitivism about truth     11 
 
and non-intrinsic) renders the property unduly complex and mysterious in an objec-
tionable way. Explanation must bottom out somewhere in the primitives of our theo-
ry. But this does not entail that we should take anything as primitive or neglect the 
pursuit of finding which primitives are more appropriate or never scrutinise the primi-
tives of our most plausible theories. We must accept some primitives but being true 
(qua substantive property) is not one of them. 
Given this counter-intuitive consequence of primitivism, we are left wondering why 
there simply is no connection between truth and entity. If the world affects truth, then 
there must be a reason why this is so. This state of wonderment is caused by the mys-
teriousness of Merricks primitivism. Appealing to talk of  is a matter of  without 
positing a relation wont solve the mystery. I am not denying the existence of non-
relational non-intrinsic properties. They may, for all I know, exist. What I am denying 
is the characterisation of a particular candidate non-relational non-intrinsic property, 
namely, being true as a primitive property. Being true is not a non-relational non-
intrinsic property. 
 
6 A Possible Reply by Merricks 
Merricks might reply to this objection by saying that being true does not have the re-
pugnant nature I am attributing to it since these kinds of properties are more common 
than we realise. One example of an allegedly acceptable non-relational non-intrinsic 
property is being such that there is nothing more in the universe.  Let  us consider an 
instance of this property. Suppose there is a world in which there is only one thing and 
that this thing has no proper parts. Call it Joe. Joe instantiates the property being 
such that there is nothing more in the universe for there is nothing else around in this 
world, including any parts that Joe might have. If Joe instantiates being such that there 
is nothing more in the universe,  then  it  is  not  because  of  anything  around  Joe  since  
nothing else exists. Thus, being such that there is nothing more in the universe is non-
relational. However, being such that there is nothing more in the universe is not intrin-
sic since whether Joe has this property is a matter of whether there exist other things 
around Joe. So, being such that there is nothing more in the universe is of the same na-
ture as being true. Since Merricks opponents such as truthmaker theorists require such 
properties in order to provide truthmakers for negative existentials and generalisa-
tions, then, Merricks might say, there is nothing wrong with saying that being true has 
a similar nature (see Merricks 2007, 182-3).8  
But this response is unsatisfying for the following reasons. First, it is dialectically 
weak since we are not considering primitivism versus relational accounts of truth. Ra-
ther we are considering primitivism versus minimalism, the latter of which does not 
require the postulation of properties such as being such that there is nothing more in 
the universe. The minimalist would applaud this concession since they would say Mer-
                                               
8 I have not said much about theories of truthmaking. But just briefly, the truthmaker theorist claims 
that what it is for a truth to be true is for a truth to be made true by a truthmaker. In other words, if 
entity t makes p true, then it is impossible for t to exist and p be false. If we believe that every truth 
must have a truthmaker, then negative truths and generalisations must have truthmakers. Armstrong 
argues that we need a totality state of affairs in addition to first-order states of affairs as truthmakers 
for such truths. See (Armstrong 2004, ch. 6). 
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ricks is just admitting he indulges with bad company. If primitivism must admit these 
sorts of properties, we should reject primitivism and relational accounts of truth for 
the same reason.9 
Second, even if Merricks claims he is not alone in positing non-relational non-
intrinsic properties, he still lacks an explanation for why being true is non-relational 
and non-intrinsic, while the truthmaker theorist can provide an explanation for the 
nature for their properties. If the truthmaker theorist can provide some kind of expla-
nation, they can make intelligible these sorts of properties, even though they are of a 
peculiar kind. Without an explanation, Merricks attempts to find company with some 
of his opponents leave him in isolation. 
The truthmaker theorist can give the following explanation. Being such that there 
is nothing more in the universe is non-relational and non-intrinsic because any instance 
of it necessarily excludes other entities from existing. Let us consider a different but 
similar property, the property of being other than a bunyip (bunyips are mythical crea-
tures that allegedly lurk in the billabongs and creeks of Australia). Now suppose we 
have the state of affairs of everything being other than a bunyip. Call this state of af-
fairs G. G cannot exist in worlds where bunyips exist, and in every world where bun-
yips do not exist G must exist. Thus, necessarily G exists iff bunyips do not exist and 
necessarily bunyips exists iff G does not exist. In other words, it is part of the nature of 
G to exclude bunyips. Thus, there is a necessary connection between G and the ab-
sence of bunyips. The appeal to necessary connections is controversial. But the point is 
that the relevant necessary connection explains why being other than a bunyip and be-
ing such that there is nothing more in the universe are non-relational and non-intrinsic.  
In the case of being true, the appeal to necessary connections is not part of the ex-
planation for why it is non-relational and non-intrinsic. Being true is non-intrinsic be-
cause whether or not a proposition has the property is a matter of what is or what is 
not around it. End of story. Perhaps, the fact that a proposition instantiates being true 
necessarily excludes other entities from existing, but this is not the reason why being 
true is non-intrinsic. And the fact that <dogs bark> instantiates being true does not ex-
clude the existence of dogs that do not bark. Hence, Merricks cannot appeal to prop-
erties such as being such that there is nothing more in the universe to draw the analogy 
he requires, for there is none.  
Overall, our main sentiment concerning truth is that truth is often a matter of what 
goes on around the things that are said to be true. This basic intuition concerning truth 
has been explained, to the dissatisfaction of many, by invoking some relation between 
truths and entities. Given this dissatisfaction and the fact that we recognise this intui-
tion,  if  we fail  to explain it,  we admit that being true has some, as Horwich puts it,  
peculiarly enigmatic character [such that] a conception of its underlying nature ap-
pears to be at once necessary and impossible (1998, 1-2, my italics). If we accept the 
fact that truth is a matter of what is around the things that are said to be true, but that 
any relational account of this intuition fails, then being true is clouded in mystery since 
we endow it with a brute nature that mysteriously points beyond itself and towards 
other entities. And this is exactly what Merricks concedes when he claims that being 
                                               
9 Merricks also thinks being such that there is nothing more in the universe is a suspicious property 
(Merricks 2007, 60). So it is unclear why he warms us up to the idea of non-relational non-intrinsic 
properties by appealing to properties he outright rejects. 
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true is had by a proposition because of what is around it, but that this is not because 
of some relation between that proposition and some entity or entities. If we admit be-
ing true has this peculiar nature, we have embraced nothing more than the primordial 
fact that the nature of truth is a mystery, something which possesses a peculiarly en-
igmatic character. We are in the business of reducing mystery where possible. So we 
should reject Merricks primitivism. 
 
7 Conclusion 
I argued that Merricks primitivism renders being true as mysterious and suspicious. So 
we should reject his primitivism, although I make no final judgements about primitiv-
ism in general. For all I have said there could be a plausible version of primitivism. But 
it  is  not Merricks.  I  further argued that Merricks  objections against  minimalism do 
not succeed since by his own lights he must take the notion of a proposition as prior to 
the notion of truth and accept the fact that we know being true is instantiated by <p> 
because we know that <p> is true iff p. The dialectic we began with assumed that all 
relational theories of truth are false, leaving the debate between primitivism and mini-
malism. Given that I argued Merricks primitivism should be rejected, minimalism 
seems to be the standing victor. More can be said in favour of minimalism. We have 
further reason to adopt it if being true is merely a logical property or has little meta-
physical weight (Horwich 1998, 146; cf. Smith 2003, 43). As Horwich argues, 
[g]iven the function of truth,  we may infer that the general  facts  which we need the 
concept of truth to articulate are not really about truth; therefore their explanation 
would not be facilitated by an account of truths underlying nature (1998, 145, his 
italics). If we undermine the need to appeal to the underlying nature of truth, it makes 
no sense to assume that the concept of truth is itself substantive. Thus, we have no rea-
son to claim that being true is a substantive property, and so another reason not to ac-
cept Merricks primitivism. 
It seems that when it comes to theories of truth minimalism is on strong footing.10 
But there is room for a theory of truthmaking to complement minimalism if the theory 
of truthmaking in question does not advertise itself as a competing theory of truth. It is 
plausible to suppose that we can compose a hybrid theory based on the assumption 
that there is a genuine difference between what it is for a truth to be true and what it is 
for a truth to be made true (Mellor 2009, 274-5). Put differently, the truthmaking pro-
ject need not provide a theory of truth, but instead a theory of truths (Forrest 2006, 
138). Therefore, we can endorse instances of (E) while acknowledging that (MT) tells 
us about truth but not about how truths are made true. The project of truthmaking 
would then sit underneath a theory of truth by playing the role of determining the el-
ements of our fundamental ontology. Of course, Merricks rejects truthmaking and 
therefore rejects truthmaking playing any sort of theoretical role. For the hybrid theory 
to succeed his critique of truthmaking must be answered and I have done nothing here 
to circumvent this particular situation.11 That, however, is the subject of another pa-
per. 
                                               
10 For further defences of other varieties of minimalism, see (Alston 1996; Mackie 1973, 17-63). 
11 Merricks main argument against truthmaking is that some truths have no truthmakers. So, truthmak-
ing is false. This argument depends on the claim that every truth must have a truthmaker. Merricks ar-
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gues that if we accept truthmaking, we should accept that every truth must have a truthmaker (Merricks 
2007, 24-6). I would reject this inference and Merricks defence of it, and so deny that every truth must 
have a truthmaker. For discussion, see (Tallant 2010).    
